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Are	the	Polish	opposition’s	prospects	really	so
hopeless?
Poland’s	liberal	and	centrist	opposition	has	struggled	to	challenge	the	country’s	Law	and	Justice
government	since	losing	the	2015	Polish	election.	Aleks	Szczerbiak	writes	that	the	opposition	lacks
convincing	leadership	and	has	failed	to	offer	a	credible	and	attractive	alternative	to	Poles	on	the	issues
that	they	care	most	about.	But	the	right-wing	ruling	party	will	go	into	local	elections	in	autumn	with	high
expectations	and	the	most	high	profile	contests	will	be	fought	in	areas	where	the	opposition	is	relatively
strong.
Poland’s	weak	and	divided	liberal-centrist	opposition	has	failed	to	mount	an	effective	challenge	to	the	right-wing	Law
and	Justice	(PiS)	grouping,	the	country’s	ruling	party	since	its	decisive	autumn	2015	election	victory.	In	March,	the
‘Pooling	the	Poles’	micro-blog	that	aggregates	voting	intention	surveys	showed	Law	and	Justice	averaging	42%
support	compared	with	only	26%	for	the	liberal-centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	Poland’s	governing	party	between	2007-
15	and	currently	the	main	opposition	grouping,	9%	for	the	anti-establishment	‘Kukiz	‘15’	grouping,	7%	for	the	smaller
liberal	‘Modern’	(Nowoczesna)	party	and	the	communist	successor	Democratic	Left	Alliance	(SLD),	and	5%	for	the
agrarian	Polish	Peasant	Party	(PSL).
Since	the	election,	Civic	Platform,	and	the	liberal-centrist	opposition	more	generally,	have	been	constantly	on	the
back-foot.	They	have	focused	on	constitutional	and	‘rule	of	law’	issues	that	are	too	distant	and	abstract	for	most
ordinary	Poles	and	failed	to	offer	a	credible	and	attractive	programmatic	alternative	on	the	more	pressing	social	and
economic	concerns	that	they	care	most	about.	Here	Law	and	Justice	is	clearly	more	in	tune	with	public	opinion	as	a
result	of	its	generous,	high	profile	social	spending	programmes	which	were	the	key	to	the	party’s	2015	election
victory	and	on	which	it	appears	to	have	delivered	in	office	while	maintaining	strong	economic	growth.	At	the	same
time,	Law	and	Justice	has	outmanoeuvred	the	opposition	by	highlighting	issues	such	as	the	European	migration
crisis	where	the	overwhelming	majority	of	Poles	share	its	vehement	opposition	to	the	EU’s	compulsory	migrant
relocation	quota	scheme,	while	Civic	Platform’s	stance	on	this	issue	has	been	equivocal	and	inconsistent.
The	opposition’s	strategy	of	trying	to	exert	pressure	on	the	government	by	invoking	the	disapproval	of,	and
presenting	the	Law	and	Justice	government	as	isolated	within,	international	institutions	such	as	the	EU	has	proved
ineffective;	indeed,	arguably	counter-productive.	Although	Poles	are	overwhelmingly	pro-EU	they	also	do	not	like
what	they	see	as	external	interference	in	the	country’s	domestic	political	affairs	and	are	critical	of	the	opposition’s
attempts	to	use	the	Union’s	institutions	and	forums	such	as	the	European	Parliament	(EP)	in	ways	that	they	feel
could	weaken	Poland’s	international	standing	and	harm	the	national	interest.
No	return	to	the	status	quo	ante
On	numerous	occasions,	the	opposition	has	shown	itself	to	be	tactically	inept,	confusing	and	alienating	even	many	of
its	core	supporters.	For	example,	in	January,	forty	Civic	Platform	and	‘Modern’	deputies	abstained	in,	or	absented
themselves	from,	a	vote	on	whether	to	refer	a	draft	bill	aimed	at	liberalising	Poland’s	abortion	law	promoted	by	the
feminist	‘Save	the	Women’	(Ratujmy	Kobiety)	civic	committee	to	the	parliamentary	committee	stage	(three	Civic
Platform	deputies	also	voted	to	reject	the	bill	outright	and	were	then	expelled	from	the	party’s	parliamentary	caucus).
This	meant	that	the	draft	law	could	not	proceed	beyond	its	first	reading	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	sixty	Law	and	Justice
deputies,	including	party	leader	Jarosław	Kaczyński,	actually	voted	against	rejecting	it	at	this	stage.	(These	deputies
strongly	opposed	the	draft	law’s	provisions	but	argued	that	all	civic-sponsored	bills	that	collected	the	requisite
number	of	supporting	signatures	should,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	be	allowed	to	proceed	to	the	committee	stage.)	The
failure	of	Civic	Platform	and	‘Modern’	to	take	a	decisive	stance	on	this	issue	provoked	a	wave	of	criticism	in	the
liberal-left	media	and	even	anti-opposition	street	demonstrations	by	feminist	and	non-parliamentary	left-wing
groupings.
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The	liberal-centrist	opposition	also	lacks	a	strong	and	convincing	leader	around	whom	government	opponents	can
rally.	Civic	Platform	leader	Grzegorz	Schetyna	lacks	dynamism	and	charisma,	but	when	he	was	elected	in	January
2016	was	nonetheless	seen	as	an	effective	political	operator	who	could	restore	a	sense	of	discipline	and	purpose	to
the	party.	However,	his	failure	to	land	any	blows	on	the	Law	and	Justice	government,	exemplified	by	the	fiasco
surrounding	the	abortion	law	vote	which	severely	damaged	Mr	Schetyna’s	reputation	as	an	effective	party	manager,
has	led	to	constant	criticism	of	him	in	the	liberal-left	media.	He	now	has	to	spend	far	too	much	time	in	internal	party
battles	with	competing	coteries	to	shore	up	his	leadership.	It	is	not	surprising	that	a	March	survey	conducted	by	the
CBOS	polling	agency	found	that	only	21%	of	respondents	declared	confidence	in	Mr	Schetyna	compared	with	51%
who	did	not,	making	him	Poland’s	least	trusted	politician.
Grzegorz	Schetyna,	Credit:	EPP	(CC	BY	2.0)
More	fundamentally,	the	liberal-centrist	opposition	has	failed	to	grasp	the	nature	of	the	social	changes	that	have
occurred	in	Poland	in	recent	years,	particularly	the	increased	insecurity	and	frustration	among	those	Poles	who	felt
that	they	had	not	shared	fully	in	the	country’s	increasing	prosperity.	Law	and	Justice’s	2015	election	victory	reflected
widespread	disillusionment	with	the	perceived	arrogance	of	the	country’s	ruling	elite	in	general	and	the	outgoing
Civic	Platform-led	government	in	particular;	with	a	strong	prevailing	mood	that	it	was	time	for	change.	Most	Poles	do
not	want	to	see	a	return	to	the	status	quo	ante	which	they	still	associate	with	the	liberal-centrist	parties	that	they
rejected	so	decisively	in	2015.	While	many	have	misgivings	about	some	of	Law	and	Justice’s	policies	and	actions,
particularly	its	programme	of	radical	state	reconstruction,	they	also	feel	that	the	government	is	at	least	trying	to	tackle
many	of	the	pathologies	which	previous	administrations	appeared	content	to	ignore.
A	potential	opening
In	fact,	the	opposition	retains	considerable	political	assets.	These	include:	a	sizeable	potential	base	of	popular
support,	especially	in	the	larger	towns	and	cities;	substantial	financial	resources	and	the	backing	of	most	of	the
privately-owned	media;	significant	influence	within,	and	widespread	support	from,	the	country’s	cultural,	legal	and
business	elites;	and	close	links	with	the	EU	political	establishment	and	Western	opinion-forming	media,	many	of
whom	share	their	dislike	of	Law	and	Justice.
Moreover,	in	recent	weeks	the	Law	and	Justice	government	has	increasingly	found	itself	on	the	defensive.	After	a
successful	launch	of	his	premiership	last	December	and	a	well-received	government	re-shuffle	in	January,	which	led
to	an	increase	in	support	for	the	ruling	party,	new	Law	and	Justice	prime	minister	Mateusz	Morawiecki	faced	a	major
crisis	concerning	the	country’s	relations	with	Israel	–	and,	as	a	consequence,	the	United	States,	the	administration’s
key	foreign	policy	ally.
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This	was	prompted	by	the	passage	at	the	end	of	January	of	a	controversial	anti-defamation	law	which	makes	it	a
criminal	offence	to	falsely	ascribe	responsibility	to	the	Polish	nation	or	state	for	the	crimes	committed	by	Nazi
Germany,	but	which	Israeli	critics	argued	could	lead	to	the	punishment	of	Holocaust	survivors	for	their	public
testimony	against	Poles	who	harmed	Jews	during	the	German	occupation.	This	was	followed	by	controversy	over	the
generous	bonuses	paid	to	Mr	Morawiecki’s	predecessor	Beata	Szydło	and	other	ministers.	All	of	this	has	provided
the	opposition	with	potential	openings	that	it	can	exploit.
Difficult	elections	for	the	ruling	party
Moreover,	the	next	major	test	for	the	Polish	parties	will	be	the	autumn	2018	local	elections	and	these	could	be	very
problematic	for	Law	and	Justice.	For	a	start,	the	ruling	party	is	likely	to	enter	the	local	election	campaign	with
extremely	high	expectations:	anything	significantly	less	than	the	38%	national	share	of	the	vote	that	it	secured	in
2015	is	likely	to	be	viewed	as	a	disappointment.	At	the	same	time,	much	attention	will	be	focused	on	the	results	of
the	mayoral	elections	in	Poland’s	large	towns	and	cities,	where	Law	and	Justice	is	relatively	weak	and	the	situation
should	be	favourable	for	the	liberal-centrist	opposition.
Winning	a	mayoral	race	in	any	of	these	areas	would	be	a	huge	achievement	for	Law	and	Justice,	particularly	given
that	victorious	candidates	have	to	secure	more	than	50%	of	the	vote,	if	necessary	in	a	second	round	run-off.	Indeed,
the	most	prestigious	and	high	profile	contest	will	be	the	Warsaw	mayoral	election	which	will	be	an	extremely	difficult
one	for	Law	and	Justice,	but	the	ruling	party	appears	to	have	manoeuvred	itself	into	a	position	where	this	could
become	a	key	symbolic	test	and	one	of	the	main	prisms	through	which	the	local	election	results	will	be	evaluated.
In	fact,	mayoral	contests	are	often	heavily	localised	and	personalised,	and	in	most	towns	the	favourites	will	be	non-
party	independents.	Moreover,	given	that	Poland’s	16	regional	authorities	play	a	major	rule	in	distributing	EU	funds
and	are	a	key	source	of	local	party	patronage,	the	most	politically	significant	of	the	local	polls	will	actually	be	the
regional	assembly	elections.	These	are	also	the	best	indicators	of	party	support	as	they	are	the	only	local
government	tier	where	elections	are	fought	on	national	party	lines.
However,	given	its	weak	coalition	potential,	if	Law	and	Justice	does	not	win	outright	majorities	in	these	assemblies	(it
is	hoping	to	do	so	in	at	least	half	of	them)	then	it	will	struggle	to	secure	control	of	many	regional	authorities,	even	if	it
emerges	as	the	largest	single	party.	In	the	previous	2014	local	elections,	for	example,	although	Law	and	Justice
narrowly	won	the	largest	share	of	the	vote	nationally	and	in	half	of	the	assembly	elections,	it	was	only	able	to	secure
a	majority	in	one	regional	authority	while	Civic	Platform	took	control	of	the	remainder	either	on	its	own	or	as	part	of	a
coalition.	One	major	problem	here	is	that	it	is	not	clear	how	well	‘Kukiz	‘15’	–	which	is	Law	and	Justice’s	most	viable
coalition	partner,	but	only	has	a	very	weak	local	organisational	base	–	will	perform	in	these	elections.
At	the	end	of	January,	in	order	to	consolidate	their	support,	and	as	an	attempt	to	regain	the	political	initiative	following
the	abortion	law	vote	fiasco,	Civic	Platform	and	‘Modern’	agreed	to	stand	joint	lists	in	the	regional	assembly
elections.	(The	two	parties	also	announced	that	they	hoped	to	stand	joint	candidates	for	mayoral	contests	in	the	large
towns	and	cities,	but	so	far	have	only	been	able	to	reach	agreement	in	Warsaw	and	Szczecin.)
At	the	same	time,	Law	and	Justice	could	be	squeezed	in	smaller	towns	by	the	Peasant	Party,	Civic	Platform’s	junior
governing	coalition	partner	between	2007-15,	which	is	hovering	around	5%	in	national	opinion	polls	but	always
performs	much	better	in	local	elections	due	to	its	strong	grassroots	organisational	base	and	the	fact	that	there	is
always	a	higher	turnout	in	these	polls	in	rural	areas	that	form	the	bedrock	of	its	support.	In	2014	the	party	won	nearly
24%	of	the	regional	assembly	vote;	although	Law	and	Justice	supporters	questioned	the	reliability	of	these	results.
Changing	opposition	fortunes?
For	sure,	while	the	local	elections	will	be	very	difficult	for	Law	and	Justice,	disappointing	results	for	Civic	Platform	will
not	only	threaten	Mr	Schetyna’s	leadership	but	also	raise	fresh	doubts	about	the	future	of	a	party	which	many	voters
continue	to	support	out	of	habit	and	a	lack	of	alternatives.	This	could	happen	if,	for	example,	the	party	loses	control	of
a	majority	of	regional	assemblies,	or	suffers	a	symbolic	defeat	in	Warsaw	or	another	large	town	or	city	currently	run
by	a	prominent	Civic	Platform	politician.
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Nonetheless,	some	commentators	argue	that,	however	weak	and	divided	the	opposition	may	appear	to	be	now,	it	will
present	a	united	front	at	the	next	parliamentary	election,	scheduled	for	autumn	2019,	and	point	to	the	agreement	of
joint	Civic	Platform-Modern	regional	election	lists	as	the	start	of	this	process	of	(at	least	partial)	consolidation.
Although	the	opposition	is	currently	at	a	very	low	ebb,	better-than-expected	local	election	results	would	provide	it	with
a	major	boost	and	could	play	a	major	role	in	helping	to	change	its	fortunes	in	the	run-up	to	next	year’s	decisive
parliamentary	poll.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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